Saturday 28 September 2013

Chemical Weapons Convention and Membership

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC)

Overview
High-level meeting in observance of the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons ConventionHigh-level meeting in observance of the tenth anniversary of the entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention
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Opened for Signature: 13 January 1993.
Entered into Force: 29 April 1997.
Duration: Indefinite.
Membership: 189 State Parties, 2 Signatories.
Signatories: Israel and Myanmar.
Depositary: UN Secretary-General.
Obligations: States Parties are required not to develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons (CW), or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone; not to use chemical weapons; not to engage in military preparations for use of chemical weapons; not to assist, encourage, or induce anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under the convention.
Each State Party is required to destroy all chemical weapons and chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, as well as any chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party no later than 10 years after entry into force of the Convention or as soon as possible in the case of States ratifying or acceding more than 10 years after entry into force. Each State Party also undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare (Article I). The Convention defines a chemical weapon as the following, together or separately:
a) Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as long as the types and quantities are consistent with such purposes; b) Munitions and devices, specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those toxic chemicals specified in Subparagraph (a), which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices; c) Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of munitions and devices specified in subparagraph (b).
The Convention identifies and categorizes toxic chemicals and precursors according to their potential for chemical weapons application and extent of industrial applications. Schedule 1 lists chemicals with high potential weapons utility and little or no industrial utility. Schedule 2 singles out chemicals with some degree of commercial application and significant potential for use in weapons. Schedule 3 chemicals are generally produced in large quantities for industrial purposes and have some potential for chemical weapons application. Declarations and verification requirements are the most stringent for Schedule 1 and the least so for Schedule 3 (Article II).
Verification and Compliance:
Verification: Verification is conducted through a combination of reporting and routine on-site inspections of declared sites. To ensure the implementation of the Convention's provisions, including those on verification and compliance, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established upon the entry into force of the Convention (29 April 1997). In addition to routine verification and recourse to a procedure for consultations, cooperation, and fact-finding, each State Party has the right to request an on-site challenge inspection of any facility or location in any other State Party for the purpose of clarifying and resolving questions concerning possible non-compliance. The challenge inspection team is designated by the Director General of the OPCW and dispatched as quickly as possible.
Compliance: Compliance measures under the OPCW include: the OPCW may request that a party take measures to redress a situation in a specific period; the OPCW may restrict or suspend a party's rights and privileges; the OPCW may recommend collective measures to States Parties, including sanctions; the OPCW may ask for an advisory opinion from the ICJ. There is also the option to refer serious violations to the UN General Assembly and Security Council. Incentives to comply with the CWC include assistance and protection against attack, such as the dispatch of emergency aid; economic and technological benefits, including the fullest possible exchange of chemistry information and technology, removal of trade and other restrictions.
Declarations: Eleven countries have declared possession of existing or former CW-production facilities: Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, France, India, Iran, Japan, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, United Kingdom, United States, and Yugoslavia. Four countries have declared CW stocks: India, Republic of Korea, Russia, and United States. Nine countries have declared old CW on their territory: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Slovenia, United Kingdom, and United States. Four countries have declared abandoned CW on their territory: China, Italy, Panama, and Poland.
Other Main Provisions: The Convention provides for the rendering to States Parties of protection against chemical weapons and assistance in the event of a chemical attack. States Parties undertake to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemicals, equipment, and scientific and technical information relating to the development and application of chemistry for purposes not prohibited under the Convention. States Parties are obliged to provide data on the import and export of scheduled chemicals, as well as on facilities and chemical production. Restrictions on transfers of Schedule 1 and 2 chemicals to States not party to the Convention entered effect at entry into force and on 29 April 2000, respectively. Those on Schedule 3 transfers will be considered effective five years from entry into force. Each State Party is required to enact national implementing legislation to, inter alia, prohibit individuals under its jurisdiction or control from engaging in activities prohibited by the Convention. Each State Party is obligated to designate or establish a national authority to serve as the focal point for liaison with the OPCW and with other States Parties.
Integration with Other Treaties and Agreements: Several agreements exist that overlap with the mandate of the CWC. The Australia Group (AG), for example, coordinates CW-related export controls and encourages related intelligence sharing among its 32 member countries. TheProliferation Security Initiative strives to prevent the transfer of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including chemical weapons. More broadly, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 requires all states to take all possible measures to prevent the proliferation of WMD. In some cases, such as with the Australia Group, countries perceive a conflict between mandates. For example, some states complain that the AG restricts the free trade in chemicals and chemical process equipment to CWC members in good standing with the OPCW and the CWC.
Developments:
2013: On 22 February a team of senior OPCW officials completed a 3-day technical assistance visit to Nay Pyi Taw upon the request by the Government of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. The visit consisted of a National Awareness workshop for senior decision-makers and was aimed at providing practical assistance to relevant agencies and stakeholders on issues relating to national implementation of the CWC.
On 8 April UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon became the first UNSG to attend a review conference of the CWC.
From 8-9 April the Third Review Conference of the CWC took place, culminating in the adoption of a two-part final document by consensus. The first part dealt with a political declaration, confirming the "unequivocal commitment" of the States Parties to the CWC. The second part was a comprehensive review of CWC implementation since the last Review Conference in 2008. There was also concern about possible chemical weapons usage in Syria. The Third Review Conference was attended by delegates from 122 of the 188 States Parties, 8 international organizations, and 3 States not Party and was chaired by Ambassador Krzystof of Poland.
On 26 April the OPCW co-organized two workshops in Angola designed to support Angola's accession to both the CWC and BTWC. The Foreign Minister of Angola affirmed Angola's commitment to accede to both conventions.
On 6 May Libya completed the destruction of its Sulfur Mustard stockpile, increasing its total declared stock to 85% destroyed and completed the destruction of its remaining Category 3 weapons, leaving its supplies of Category 2 weapons to be destroyed.
On 27 May the ninth regional assistance-and-protection course for Asian State Parties was conducted jointly by the OPCW and the Republic of Korea.
On 29 May Somalia became the 189th State Party to the CWC.
On 1 June Al Qaeda operatives were arrested in Iraq after attempting to create chemical weapons to be used in attacks against Europe and the United States. Five men were arrested by Iraqi security with aid from foreign intelligence.
On 4 June an UN report confirmed four uses of chemical weapons during attacks on Khan Al-Asal, Aleppo, 19 March; Uteibah, Damascus, 19 March; Sheikh Maqsood neighbourhood, Aleppo, 13 April; and Saraqib, Idlib, 29 April. However, the precise weapons used, delivery systems, or perpetrators were not clear and remain under investigation.
On 4-6 June the 11th Regional Meeting of African National Authorities was co-hosted between the Republic of Congo and the OPCW with 60 participants from 27 State Parties to discuss issues relating to the CWC implementation in Africa and for States Parties to exchange information.
On 7 June the 16th International Chemical Weapons Disarmament Conference opened. The Director-General of the OPCW opened the event with an update on the current stockpiles of chemical weapons. According to the OPCW almost 81% of Category 1 chemical weapons, 52% of Category 2 weapons, and all Category 3 weapons have been destroyed.
On 13 June officials from the Hague, Geneva, and Vienna visited OPCW headquarters to strengthen cooperation among the three cities, as they are the bastions of large diplomatic communities and international organizations dealing with disarmament and nonproliferation issues.
2012: On 17-19 January, the OPCW sent inspectors to Libya to verify chemical weapons stockpiles that were disclosed after the fall of the Qadhafi regime. Libya must now present a comprehensive plan and date for the destruction of the stockpiles.
On 26 January, the Technical Secretariat conducted a briefing for OPCW Permanent Representations in Brussels. The briefing included details on the legal framework required for the national implementation of the CWC, and on the international assistance provided by the OPCW to assist states in capacity building to improve their implementation of the CWC.
On 1 March, OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü met with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon. Director-General Üzümcü updated the Secretary-General on the status of undeclared stockpiles of mustard agent found in Libya, and noted with concern the possibility of chemical weapons in Syria.
In March, OPCW inspectors inspected their 1,000th “Other Chemical Production Facilities” (OCPFs) site as classified under Article VI of the CWC. The 1000th site inspection was conducted at an industrial plant in France.
On 23 March, OPCW Executive Council and Director-General met with officials in Moscowconcerning issues related to the CWC. The delegation also toured a new chemical weapons destruction facility being built at Kizner, Udmurtia oblast. The Russian Federation has destroyed more than 60% of its stockpiles, according to the Kremlin. This is faster than initially expected.
From 16-19 April, the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) met in its 18th session at OPCW headquarters. The SAB discussed scientific and technological elements of verification methodologies, emerging technologies and new equipment, and Scheduled chemicals and the Annex on Chemicals. The Board also began work in preparation for the Third Review Conference to be held in April 2013.
29 April 2012 marked the passing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) deadline for possessors of chemical weapons  to eliminate their stockpiles. However, the United States maintains that it has destroyed 90 percent of its stockpile and will destroy the remaining 10 percent“as soon as practicable.”
On 22 May OPCW Director-General Ahmet Üzümcü addressed the 15th and final international Chemical Weapons Demilitarisation (CWD) Conference, hosted by the UK’s Defence Science and Technology Laboratory. This event marked the passing of the 29 April 2012 deadline for possessors of chemical weapons to eliminate their stockpiles, and celebrated the global progress in chemical weapons destruction.
On 7 June the Open Ended Working Group (OEWG) for preparation of the Third Review Conference of the States Parties of the Chemical Weapons Convention to review the operation of the Convention held its first meeting. The Third Review Conference will be held from 8 to 19 April 2013 in The Hague.
2011: On 11 March, OPCW Director-General Ambassdor Ahmet Üzümcü met with the Permanent Representative of Libya, who notified Ambassador Üzümcü that "in accordance with the information he has received from Tripoli," plans to destroy Libya's chemical weapons remain "unchanged and under control."
On 6 and 9 May, the Executive Council of the OPCW issued concerns regarding the CW stockpiles in Libya and the 15 May deadline for destroying the state's mustard agent cache.
On 16 May, Libya requested an extension of the destruction deadline of its mustard agent cache.
On 31 May, Russian State Duma international affairs committee head Konstantin Kosachyov said Moscow has set 31 December 2015, as the target date for elimination of the nation's entire arsenal of chemical warfare agents. The CWC requires that Russia destroy its chemical arsenal, which originally weighed in at roughly 40,000 metric tons, by April 2012. Moscow has declared that operations would be completed at an unidentified point in 2015.
The Russian government announced that, as of 30 May, it had eliminated slightly more than half of its original chemical stockpile of approximately 40,000 metric tons of chemical warfare materials.
On 24 June five inspectors from Slovakia, Russia, Netherlands, Mongolia and China confirmed the culpability of the weapons stored at the Blue Grass Army Depot in Richmond, Kentucky and assured their compliance with the CWC.
On 30 June a conference on implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention was held in Nassau and was attended by 14 representatives of Caribbean states. The goal of the conference was to help amplify the regions enforcement policies and procedures on the ban of chemical weapons. A particular point that was brought up was the region's compliance with export and import clauses of the CWC and the necessity for rigorous port control to avoid illicit smuggling.
During the OPCW's (Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons) Executive Council meeting in July, Iran's ambassador to the Netherlands Kazem Gharibabadi highlighted the crucial need for the abolishment of all chemical weapons by the indicated deadline of the CWC. He specifically referred to the United States and Russia as countries with the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons.
On 28 November-2 December, the 16th Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention took place. 
On 9 December, the OPCW released a statement concerning the outcomes of the 16th Session of the Conference of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Libya, the Russian Federation, and the United States announced they would not meet the deadline of April 29, 2012 for destruction of declared chemical weapons. The number of industrial chemical inspections will be expanded from the current number of 209 to 241 in 2014 and will use a new selection method which focuses on facilities of most concern to the CWC. The Conference also requested that the Executive Council look for additional measures to ensure international cooperation under the CWC.
2010: As of July 2010, only three declared CW states have completed dismantlement: AlbaniaSouth Korea, and India. Russia and the United States will likely not complete dismantlement by their extended 2012 deadline. Some experts have estimated it may take until 2021 for the United States to fulfill their treaty obligations. Other countries also sought and won extensions of the 2007 deadline: South Korea until 2008, Libya until 2010, and Japan until 2012 to clean up CW left in China during World War II.
2009: Iraq acceded to the Convention on 13 January, and the Bahamas ratified the Convention on 21 April.
With the addition of the Bahamas as a State Party, the number of remaining states not Party to the Convention is reduced to seven: Angola, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Egypt, Israel, Myanmar, Somalia, and Syria.
2008: Congo's status as a member state was made official on 1 March.
The Second Review Conference took place on April 7-18 2008 with the participation 114 States Parties. Angola, Iraq and Lebanon were accorded observer status. The conference was chaired by Ambassador Waleed Ben Abdel Karim El Khereiji of Saudi Arabia.
The conference report noted that since the first review conference of 2003, the total number of States Parties had risen from 151 to 183, leaving only 12 states still to join the convention. It also noted that by 1 April 2008, over 38% of the total stockpiles of 70,000 tons of Category 1 chemical weapons initially declared by States Parties had been destroyed. However, the Second Review Conference expressed its concern that more than 60% of stockpiles still remained to be destroyed.
Guinea-Bissau acceded to the convention on 20 May. Lebanon acceded to the CWC on 20 November, and the instrument of accession entered into force 30 days later.
2007: Barbados acceded to the Convention on 7 March. Congo deposited its instrument of ratification on 4 December. As of December 2007, there were 183 state parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention.
In January, Turkey reported that its implementing legislation had entered into force on December 2006. On 27 March 2007, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland announced that it had destroyed all old chemical weapons stocks declared to the OPCW.
From 23 to 26 April, Director-General of the OPCW, Ambassador Rogelio Pfirter, attended the destruction of old chemical weapons in Germany by the government-owned company, GEKA, charged with the destruction of the last two old chemical weapons munitions stockpiles from World War II.
2006: The following states have ratified/acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention: Djibouti (25 January), Haiti (22 February), Liberia (23 February), Comoros (17 August), Central African Republic (20 September), and Montenegro (23 October — the entry-into-force of the convention for Montenegro was retroactive to the country's date of independence on 3 June).
In November, Bangladesh announced the approval of comprehensive implementing legislation, later confirmed to be in place in December. Saint Kitts and Nevis reported their Chemical Weapons (Prohibition and Control) Bill had been passed and was going through the necessary administrative processes before it enters into force. The United Arab Emirates submitted a copy of their recently adopted implementing legislation.
In December, during the eighth annual meeting of National Authorities, Andorra submitted a copy of comprehensive legislative measures to implement the Convention. Belize reported their enactment of implementing legislation; however, no submission under Article VII (5) has been received yet. Comoros reported that it has a National Authority in place; however, formal notification has yet to be received. Fiji announced that they have enacted implementing legislation pending a commencement order that will be issued when regulations are in place. Senegal submitted a copy of its implementing legislation which was adopted on 16 October.
2005: The following states ratified/acceded to the CWC: Niue (21 April), Grenada (3 June), the Kingdom of Cambodia (19 July), the Kingdom of Bhutan (18 August), the Republic of Honduras (29 August), Antigua and Barbuda (29 August), the Republic of Vanuatu (16 September), and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (12 October).
2004: The following states have ratified/acceded to the CWC: Libya (5 February), Tuvalu (18 February), Rwanda (30 April), Saint Kitts and Nevis (21 May), Marshall Islands (18 June), Solomon Islands (23 September), Sierra Leone (30 September), Madagascar (20 October).
2003: Afghanistan deposited its instrument of ratification to the Convention with the Secretary General of the United Nations on 24 September 2003
The First Review Conference of the CWC was held from 28 April to 9 May 2003 in The Hague. From the 151 States Parties to the CWC, 110 delegations attended the Conference. The States Parties adopted both a Political Declaration and a Review Document at the end of the Conference.
The Political Declaration evaluated the operation of the Convention. The declaration stressed the importance of the timely destruction of chemical weapons, a credible verification regime related to the chemical industry and other facilities used for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, and increased effectiveness and efficiency, to achieve the nonproliferation and confidence-building aims of the Convention. The CWC also recognized the role of the United Nations in the fight against global terrorism and emphasized the importance universal adherence to the Convention could play in preventing access to chemical weapons by terrorists. The States Parties also stressed the need for the OPCW to continue promoting the free trade of chemicals as well as international cooperation and the exchange of scientific and technological development.
The Review Document assessed the implementation of specific provisions of the Convention during its first six years. The document reviewed the CWC's role in enhancing international peace and security, universality of the treaty, declarations and verification, inspections of chemical weapons and industrial facilities, and the OPCW's ability to assist and protect States Parties from use or threat of use of chemical weapons attacks. It took into consideration economical and technological developments within the chemical industries. The document encouraged States Parties to provide assistance upon request to other CWC States Parties in the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles, while also stressing the importance of enhanced cost effectiveness of the verification measures applied to stockpiles and destruction facilities.
The Review Document also recognized the request of the UN Security Council that international organizations whose activities relate to the control of or of access to chemical and other deadly materials evaluate ways in which they can enhance the effectiveness of their activities against terrorism. The First Review Conference noted that a large part of the OPCW's verification resources had been spent on the verification of chemical weapons destruction operations. Given the increase in chemical destruction that will take place in the coming years, the Conference emphasized the importance of reviewing current verification methodology in an effort to optimize the CWC's verification regime. The First Review Conference noted that current confidentiality guidelines provide neither for the destruction of confidential documents and other data, including those kept on the Secretariat's Security Critical Network, nor for the downgrading of their classification levels over the long term. The First Review Conference encouraged the OPCW to take steps to reach agreement on developing and implementing guidelines regarding the long-term handling of confidential information. It also noted that no challenge inspections or investigations of alleged use had been requested of the OPCW since its entry into force.
Point of Contact:
Director-General Ambassador Ahmet Üzümcü (Turkey)
Johan de Wittlaan 32
2517 JR, The Hague
The Netherlands
Tel: 31-70-416-33-00
Fax: 31-70-306-35-35
CNS logo
This material is produced independently for NTI by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and does not necessarily reflect the opinions of and has not been independently verified by NTI or its directors, officers, employees, or agents. Copyright © 2013 National Journal Group, Inc., 600 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, DC 20037.




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http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/convention-prohibition-development-production-stockpiling-and-use-chemical-weapons-and-their-destruction-cwc/

Washington Post: DIA sending hundreds more spies overseas

DIA sending hundreds more spies overseas

http://www.washingtonpost.com/rf/image_404h/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2012/10/29/National-Security/Images/514773464-846.jpg
File/AFP/Getty Images - Islamist militant groups in Africa, weapons transfers by North Korea and Iran and military modernization in China are among the Pentagon’s top intelligence priorities, officials say.

By Greg Miller, Published: December 2, 2012 E-mail the writer

The Pentagon will send hundreds of additional spies overseas as part of an ambitious plan to assemble an espionage network that rivals the CIA in size, U.S. officials said.
The project is aimed at transforming the Defense Intelligence Agency, which has been dominated for the past decade by the demands of two wars, into a spy service focused on emerging threats and more closely aligned with the CIA and elite military commando units.
When the expansion is complete, the DIA is expected to have as many as 1,600 “collectors” in positions around the world, an unprecedented total for an agency whose presence abroad numbered in the triple digits in recent years.

The total includes military attachés and others who do not work undercover. But U.S. officials said the growth will be driven over a five-year period by the deployment of a new generation of clandestine operatives. They will be trained by the CIA and often work with the U.S. Joint Special Operations Command, but they will get their spying assignments from the Department of Defense.
Among the Pentagon’s top intelligence priorities, officials said, are Islamist militant groups in Africa, weapons transfers by North Korea and Iran, and military modernization underway in China.
“This is not a marginal adjustment for DIA,” the agency’s director, Lt. Gen. Michael T. Flynn, said at a recent conference, during which he outlined the changes but did not describe them in detail. “This is a major adjustment for national security.”
The sharp increase in DIA undercover operatives is part of a far-reaching trend: a convergence of the military and intelligence agencies that has blurred their once-distinct missions, capabilities and even their leadership ranks.
Through its drone program, the CIA now accounts for a majority of lethal U.S. operations outside the Afghan war zone. At the same time, the Pentagon’s plan to create what it calls the Defense Clandestine Service, or DCS, reflects the military’s latest and largest foray into secret intelligence work.
The DIA overhaul — combined with the growth of the CIA since the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks — will create a spy network of unprecedented size. The plan reflects the Obama administration’s affinity for espionage and covert action over conventional force. It also fits in with the administration’s efforts to codify its counterterrorism policies for a sustained conflict and assemble the pieces abroad necessary to carry it out.
Unlike the CIA, the Pentagon’s spy agency is not authorized to conduct covert operations that go beyond intelligence gathering, such as drone strikes, political sabotage or arming militants.
But the DIA has long played a major role in assessing and identifying targets for the U.S. military, which in recent years has assembled a constellation of drone bases stretching from Afghanistan to East Africa.
The expansion of the agency’s clandestine role is likely to heighten concerns that it will be accompanied by an escalation in lethal strikes and other operations outside public view. Because of differences in legal authorities, the military isn’t subject to the same congressional notification requirements as the CIA, leading to potential oversight gaps.
U.S. officials said that the DIA’s realignment won’t hamper congressional scrutiny. “We have to keep congressional staffs and members in the loop,” Flynn said in October, adding that he believes the changes will help the United States anticipate threats and avoid being drawn more directly into what he predicted will be an “era of persistent conflict.”
U.S. officials said the changes for the DIA were enabled by a rare syncing of personalities and interests among top officials at the Pentagon and CIA, many of whom switched from one organization to the other to take their current jobs.
 “The stars have been aligning on this for a while,” said a former senior U.S. military official involved in planning the DIA transformation. Like most others interviewed for this article, the former official spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the classified nature of the program.
The DIA project has been spearheaded by Michael G. Vickers, the top intelligence official at the Pentagon and a veteran of the CIA.
Agreements on coordination were approved by Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta, a former CIA director, and retired Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, who resigned abruptly as CIA chief last month over an extramarital affair.
The Pentagon announced the DCS plan in April but details have been kept secret. Former senior Defense Department officials said that the DIA now has about 500 “case officers,” the term for clandestine Pentagon and CIA operatives, and that the number is expected to reach between 800 and 1,000 by 2018.
Pentagon and DIA officials declined to discuss specifics. A senior U.S. defense official said the changes will affect thousands of DIA employees, as analysts, logistics specialists and others are reassigned to support additional spies.
The plan still faces some hurdles, including the challenge of creating “cover” arrangements for hundreds of additional spies. U.S. embassies typically have a set number of slots for intelligence operatives posing as diplomats, most of which are taken by the CIA.
The project has also encountered opposition from policymakers on Capitol Hill, who see the terms of the new arrangement as overly generous to the CIA.
The DIA operatives “for the most part are going to be working for CIA station chiefs,” needing their approval to enter a particular country and clearance on which informants they intend to recruit, said a senior congressional official briefed on the plan. “If CIA needs more people working for them, they should be footing the bill.”
Pentagon officials said that sending more DIA operatives overseas will shore up intelligence on subjects that the CIA is not able or willing to pursue. “We are in a position to contribute to defense priorities that frankly CIA is not,” the senior Defense Department official said.
The project was triggered by a classified study by the director of national intelligence last year that concluded that key Pentagon intelligence priorities were falling into gaps created by the DIA’s heavy focus on battlefield issues and CIA’s extensive workload. U.S. officials said the DIA needed to be repositioned as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan give way to what many expect will be a period of sporadic conflicts and simmering threats requiring close-in intelligence work.
“It’s the nature of the world we’re in,” said the senior defense official, who is involved in overseeing the changes at the DIA. “We just see a long-term era of change before things settle.”
The CIA is increasingly overstretched. Obama administration officials have said they expect the agency’s drone campaign against al-Qaeda to continue for at least a decade more, even as the agency faces pressure to stay abreast of issues including turmoil across the Middle East. Meanwhile, the CIA hasn’t met ambitious goals set by former president George W. Bush to expand its own clandestine service.
CIA officials including John D. Bennett, director of the National Clandestine Service, have backed the DIA’s plan. It “amplifies the ability of both CIA and DIA to achieve the best results,” said CIA spokesman Preston Golson.
Defense officials stressed that the DIA has not been given any new authorities or permission to expand its total payroll. Instead, the new spy slots will be created by cutting or converting other positions across the DIA workforce, which has doubled in the past decade — largely through absorption of other military intelligence entities — to about 16,500.
Vickers has given the DIA an infusion of about $100 million to kick-start the program, officials said, but the agency’s total budget is expected to remain stagnant or decline amid mounting financial pressures across the government.
The DIA’s overseas presence already includes hundreds of diplomatic posts — mainly defense attachés, who represent the military at U.S. embassies and openly gather information from foreign counterparts. Their roles won’t change, officials said. The attachés are part of the 1,600 target for the DIA, but such “overt” positions will represent a declining share amid the increase in undercover slots, officials said.
The senior Defense official said the DIA has begun filling the first of the new posts.
For decades, the DIA has employed undercover operatives to gather secrets on foreign militaries and other targets. But the Defense Humint Service, as it was previously known, was often regarded as an inferior sibling to its civilian counterpart.
Previous efforts by the Pentagon to expand its intelligence role — particularly during Donald H. Rumsfeld’s time as defense secretary — led to intense turf skirmishes with the CIA.
Those frictions have been reduced, officials said, largely because the CIA sees advantages to the new arrangement, including assurances that its station chiefs overseas will be kept apprised of DIA missions and have authority to reject any that might conflict with CIA efforts. The CIA will also be able to turn over hundreds of Pentagon-driven assignments to newly arrived DIA operatives.
“The CIA doesn’t want to be looking for surface-to-air missiles in Libya” when it’s also under pressure to assess the opposition in Syria, said a former high-ranking U.S. military intelligence officer who worked closely with both spy services. Even in cases where their assignments overlap, the DIA is likely to be more focused than the CIA on military aspects — what U.S. commanders in Africa might ask about al-Qaeda in Mali, for example, rather than the broader questions raised by the White House.
U.S. officials said DIA operatives, because of their military backgrounds, are often better equipped to recruit sources who can answer narrow military questions such as specifications of China’s fifth-generation fighter aircraft and its work on a nuclear aircraft carrier. “The CIA would like to give up that kind of work,” the former officer said.
The CIA has agreed to add new slots to its training classes at its facility in southern Virginia, known as the Farm, to make room for more military spies. The DIA has accounted for about 20 percent of each class in recent years, but that figure will grow.
The two agencies have also agreed to share resources overseas, including technical gear, logistics support, space in facilities and vehicles. The DIA has even adopted aspects of the CIA’s internal structure, creating a group called “Persia House,” for example, to pool resources on Iran.
The CIA’s influence extends across the DIA’s ranks. Flynn, who became director in July, is a three-star Army general who worked closely with the CIA in Afghanistan and Iraq. His deputy, David R. Shedd, spent the bulk of his career at the CIA, much of it overseas as a spy.
Several officials said the main DIA challenge will be finding ways to slip so many spies into position overseas with limited space in embassies. “There are some definite challenges from a cover perspective,” the senior defense official said.
Placing operatives in conventional military units means finding an excuse for them to stay behind when the unit rotates out before the end of the spy’s job.
Having DIA operatives pose as academics or business executives requires painstaking work to create those false identities, and it means they won’t be protected by diplomatic immunity if caught.
Flynn is seeking to reduce turnover in the DIA’s clandestine service by enabling military members to stay with the agency for multiple overseas tours rather than return to their units. But the DIA is increasingly hiring civilians to fill out its spy ranks.
The DIA has also forged a much tighter relationship with JSOC, the military’s elite and highly lethal commando force, which also carries out drone strikes in Yemen and other countries.
Key aspects of the DIA’s plan were developed by then-Director Ronald L. Burgess, a retired three-star general who had served as intelligence chief to JSOC.
The DIA played an extensive and largely hidden role in JSOC operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, sending analysts into war zones and turning a large chunk of its workforce and computer systems in Virginia into an ana-lytic back office for JSOC.
The head of U.S. Special Operations Command, Adm. William H. McRaven, who directed the operation that killed Osama bin Laden, has pledged to create between 100 and 200 slots for undercover DIA operatives to work with Special Forces teams being deployed across North Africa and other trouble spots, officials said.
“Bill McRaven is a very strong proponent of this,” the senior Defense official said.

Washington Post: Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations

Remote U.S. base at core of secret operations

This is the third of three articles.
DJIBOUTI CITY, Djibouti — Around the clock, about 16 times a day, drones take off or land at a U.S. military base here, the combat hub for the Obama administration’scounterterrorism wars in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East.

Some of the unmanned aircraft are bound for Somalia, the collapsed state whose border lies just 10 miles to the southeast. Most of the armed drones, however, veer north across the Gulf of Aden to Yemen, another unstable country where they are being used in an increasingly deadly warwith an al-Qaeda franchise that has targeted the United States.
Camp Lemonnier, a sun-baked Third World outpost established by the French Foreign Legion, began as a temporary staging ground for U.S. Marines looking for a foothold in the region a decade ago. Over the past two years, the U.S. military has clandestinely transformed it into the busiest Predator drone base outside the Afghan war zone, a model for fighting a new generation of terrorist groups.
The Obama administration has gone toextraordinary lengths to conceal the legal and operational details of its targeted-killing program. Behind closed doors, painstaking debates precede each decision to place an individual in the cross hairs of the United States’ perpetual war against al-Qaeda and its allies.
Increasingly, the orders to find, track or kill those people are delivered to Camp Lemonnier. Virtually the entire 500-acre camp is dedicated to counterterrorism, making it the only installation of its kind in the Pentagon’s global network of bases.
Secrecy blankets most of the camp’s activities. The U.S. military rejected requests from The Washington Post to tour Lemonnier last month. Officials cited “operational security concerns,” although they have permitted journalists to visit in the past.
After a Post reporter showed up in Djibouti uninvited, the camp’s highest-ranking commander consented to an interview — on the condition that it take place away from the base, at Djibouti's lone luxury hotel. The commander, Army Maj. Gen. Ralph O. Baker, answered some general queries but declined to comment on drone operations or missions related to Somalia or Yemen.
Despite the secrecy, thousands of pages of military records obtained by The Post — including construction blueprints, drone accident reports and internal planning memos — open a revealing window into Camp Lemonnier. None of the documents is classified and many were acquired via public-records requests.
Taken together, the previously undisclosed documents show how the Djibouti-based drone wars sharply escalated early last year after eight Predators arrived at Lemonnier. The records also chronicle the Pentagon’s ambitious plan to further intensify drone operations here in the coming months.
The documents point to the central role played by the Joint Special Operations Command(JSOC), which President Obama has repeatedly relied on to execute the nation’s most sensitive counterterrorism missions.
About 300 Special Operations personnel plan raids and coordinate drone flights from inside a high-security compound at Lemonnier that is dotted with satellite dishes and ringed by concertina wire. Most of the commandos work incognito, concealing their names even from conventional troops on the base.


Other counterterrorism work at Lemonnier is more overt. All told, about 3,200 U.S. troops, civilians and contractors are assigned to the camp, where they train foreign militaries, gather intelligence and dole out humanitarian aid across East Africa as part of a campaign to prevent extremists from taking root.
In Washington, the Obama administration has taken a series of steps to sustain the drone campaign for another decade, developing an elaborate new targeting database, called the “disposition matrix,” and a classified “playbook” to spell out how decisions on targeted killing are made.

Djibouti is the clearest example of how the United States is laying the groundwork to carry out these operations overseas. For the past decade, the Pentagon has labeled Lemonnier an “expeditionary,” or temporary, camp. But it is now hardening into the U.S. military’s first permanent drone war base.
Centerpiece base
In August, the Defense Department delivered a master plan to Congressdetailing how the camp will be used over the next quarter-century. About $1.4 billion in construction projects are on the drawing board, including a huge new compound that could house up to 1,100 Special Operations forces, more than triple the current number.
Drones will continue to be in the forefront. In response to written questions from The Post, the U.S. military confirmed publicly for the first time the presence of remotely piloted aircraft — military parlance for drones — at Camp Lemonnier and said they support “a wide variety of regional security missions.”
Intelligence collected from drone and other surveillance missions “is used to develop a full picture of the activities of violent extremist organizations and other activities of interest,” Africa Command, the arm of the U.S. military that oversees the camp, said in a statement. “However, operational security considerations prevent us from commenting on specific missions.”
For nearly a decade, the United States flew drones from Lemonnier only rarely, starting with a 2002 strike in Yemen that killed a suspected ringleader of the attack on the USS Cole.
That swiftly changed in 2010, however, after al-Qaeda’s network in Yemen attempted to bomb two U.S.-bound airliners and jihadists in Somalia separately consolidated their hold on that country. Late that year, records show, the Pentagon dispatched eight unmanned MQ-1B Predator aircraft to Djibouti and turned Lemonnier into a full-time drone base.
The impact was apparent months later: JSOC drones from Djibouti and CIA Predators from a secret base on the Arabian Peninsula converged over Yemen and killed Anwar al-Awlaki, a U.S.-born cleric and prominent al-Qaeda member.
Today, Camp Lemonnier is the centerpiece of an expanding constellation of half a dozen U.S. drone and surveillance bases in Africa, created to combat a new generation of terrorist groups across the continent, from Mali to Libya to the Central African Republic. The U.S. military also flies drones from small civilian airports in Ethiopia and the Seychelles, but those operations pale in comparison to what is unfolding in Djibouti.
Lemonnier also has become a hub for conventional aircraft. In October 2011, the military boosted the airpower at the base by deploying a squadron of F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jets, which can fly faster and carry more munitions than Predators.
In its written responses, Africa Command confirmed the warplanes’ presence but declined to answer questions about their mission. Two former U.S. defense officials, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said the F-15s are flying combat sorties over Yemen, an undeclared development in the growing war against al-Qaeda forces there.
The drones and other military aircraft have crowded the skies over the Horn of Africa so much that the risk of an aviation disaster has soared.
Since January 2011, Air Force records show, five Predators armed with Hellfire missiles crashed after taking off from Lemonnier, including one drone that plummeted to the ground in a residential area of Djibouti City. No injuries were reported but four of the drones were destroyed.
Predator drones in particular are more prone to mishaps than manned aircraft, Air Force statistics show. But the accidents rarely draw public attention because there are no pilots or passengers.
As the pace of drone operations has intensified in Djibouti, Air Force mechanics have reported mysterious incidents in which the airborne robots went haywire.
In March 2011, a Predator parked at the camp started its engine without any human direction, even though the ignition had been turned off and the fuel lines closed. Technicians concluded that a software bug had infected the “brains” of the drone, but never pinpointed the problem.
“After that whole starting-itself incident, we were fairly wary of the aircraft and watched it pretty closely,” an unnamed Air Force squadron commander testified to an investigative board, according to a transcript. “Right now, I still think the software is not good.”
Prime location
Djibouti is an impoverished former French colony with fewer than 1 million people, scarce natural resources and miserably hot weather.
But as far as the U.S. military is concerned, the country's strategic value is unparalleled. Sandwiched between East Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, Camp Lemonnier enables U.S. aircraft to reach hot spots such as Yemen or Somalia in minutes. Djibouti’s port also offers easy access to the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea.
“This is not an outpost in the middle of nowhere that is of marginal interest,” said Amanda J. Dory, the Pentagon’s deputy assistant secretary for Africa. “This is a very important location in terms of U.S. interests, in terms of freedom of navigation, when it comes to power projection.”
The U.S. military pays $38 million a year to lease Camp Lemonnier from the Djiboutian government. The base rolls across flat, sandy terrain on the edge of Djibouti City, a somnolent capital with eerily empty streets. During the day, many people stay indoors to avoid the heat and to chew khat, a mildly intoxicating plant that is popular in the region.
Hemmed in by the sea and residential areas, Camp Lemonnier’s primary shortcoming is that it has no space to expand. It is forced to share a single runway with Djibouti’s only international airport, as well as an adjoining French military base and the tiny Djiboutian armed forces.
Passengers arriving on commercial flights — there are about eight per day — can occasionally spy a Predator drone preparing for a mission. In between flights, the unmanned aircraft park under portable, fabric-covered hangars to shield them from the wind and curious eyes.
Behind the perimeter fence, construction crews are rebuilding the base to better accommodate the influx of drones. Glimpses of the secret operations can be found in an assortment of little-noticed Pentagon memoranda submitted to Congress.
Last month, for example, the Defense Department awarded a $62 million contractto build an airport taxiway extension to handle increased drone traffic at Lemonnier, an ammunition storage site and a combat-loading area for bombs and missiles.
In an Aug. 20 letter to Congress explaining the emergency contract, Deputy Defense Secretary Ashton B. Carter said that 16 drones and four fighter jets take off or land at the Djibouti airfield each day, on average. Those operations are expected to increase, he added, without giving details.
In a separate letter to Congress, Carter said Camp Lemonnier is running out of space to park its drones, which he referred to as remotely piloted aircraft (RPA), and other planes. “The recent addition of fighters and RPAs has exacerbated the situation, causing mission delays,” he said.
Carter’s letters revealed that the drones and fighter aircraft at the base support three classified military operations, code-namedCopper Dune, Jupiter Garret and Octave Shield.
Copper Dune is the name of the military’s counterterrorism operations in Yemen. Africa Command said it could not provide information about Jupiter Garret and Octave Shield, citing secrecy restrictions. The code names are unclassified.
The military often assigns similar names to related missions. Octave Fusion was the code name for a Navy SEAL-led operation in Somalia that rescued an American and a Danish hostage on Jan. 24.
Spilled secrets
Another window into the Djibouti drone operations can be found in U.S. Air Force safety records.
Whenever a military aircraft is involved in a mishap, the Air Force appoints an Accident Investigation Board to determine the cause. Although the reports focus on technical questions, supplementary documents make it possible to re-create a narrative of what happened in the hours leading up to a crash.
Air Force officers investigating the crash of a Predator on May 17, 2011, found that things started to go awry at Camp Lemonnier late that night when a man known as Frog emerged from the Special Operations compound.
The camp’s main power supply had failed and the phone lines were down. So Frog walked over to the flight line to deliver some important news to the Predator ground crew on duty, according to the investigators’ files, which were obtained by The Post as part of a public-records request.
“Frog” was the alias chosen by a major assigned to the Joint Special Operations Command. At Lemonnier, he belonged to a special collection of Navy SEALs, Delta Force soldiers, Air Force commandos and Marines known simply as “the task force.”
JSOC commandos spend their days and nights inside their compound as they plot raids against terrorist camps and pirate hideouts. Everybody on the base is aware of what they do, but the topic is taboo. “I can’t acknowledge the task force,” said Baker, the Army general and highest-ranking commander at Lemonnier.
Frog coordinated Predator hunts. He did not reveal his real name to anyone without a need to know, not even the ground-crew supervisors and operators and mechanics who cared for the Predators. The only contact came when Frog or his friends occasionally called from their compound to say it was time to ready a drone for takeoff or to prepare for a landing.
Information about each Predator mission was kept so tightly compartmentalized that the ground crews were ignorant of the drones’ targets and destinations. All they knew was that most of their Predators eventually came back, usually 20 or 22 hours later, earlier if something went awry.
On this particular night, Frog informed the crew that his Predator was returning unexpectedly, 17 hours into the flight, because of a slow oil leak.
It was not an emergency. But as the drone descended toward Djibouti City it entered a low-hanging cloud that obscured its camera sensor. Making matters worse, the GPS malfunctioned and gave incorrect altitude readings.
The crew operating the drone was flying blind. It guided the Predator on a “dangerously low glidepath,” Air Force investigators concluded, and crashed the remote-controlled plane 2.7 miles short of the runway.
The site was in a residential area and fire trucks rushed to the scene. The drone had crashed in a vacant lot and its single Hellfire missile had not detonated.
The Predator splintered apart and was a total loss. With a $3 million price tag, it had cost less than one-tenth the price of an F-15 Strike Eagle.
But in terms of spilling secrets, the damage was severe. Word spread quickly about the mysterious insect-shaped plane that had dropped from the sky. Hundreds of Djiboutians gathered and gawked at the wreckage for hours until the U.S. military arrived to retrieve the pieces.
One secret that survived, however, was Frog’s identity. The official Air Force panel assigned to investigate the Predator accident couldn’t determine his real name, much less track him down for questioning.
“Who is Frog?” one investigator demanded weeks later while interrogating a ground crew member, according to a transcript. “I’m sorry, I was just getting more explanation as to who Frog — is that a person? Or is that like a position?”
The crew member explained that Frog was a liaison officer from the task force. “He’s a Pred guy,” he shrugged. “I actually don’t know his last name.”
The accident triggered alarms at the upper echelons of the Air Force because it was the fourth drone in four months from Camp Lemonnier to crash.
Ten days earlier, on May 7, 2011, a drone carrying a Hellfire missile had an electrical malfunction shortly after it entered Yemeni airspace, according to an Air Force investigative report. The Predator turned back toward Djibouti. About one mile offshore, it rolled uncontrollably to the right, then back to the left before flipping belly up and hurtling into the sea.
“I’ve never seen a Predator do that before in my life, except in videos of other crashes,” a sensor operator from the ground crew told investigators, according to a transcript. “I’m just glad we landed it in the ocean and not someplace else.”
Flying every sortie
The remote-control drones in Djibouti are flown, via satellite link, by pilots 8,000 miles away in the United States, sitting at consoles in air-conditioned quarters at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada and Cannon Air Force Base in New Mexico.
At Camp Lemonnier, conditions are much less pleasant for the Air Force ground crews that launch, recover and fix the drones.
In late 2010, after military cargo planes transported the fleet of eight Predators to Djibouti, airmen from the 60th Air Force Expeditionary Reconnaissance Squadron unpacked the drones from their crates and assembled them.
Soon after, without warning, a microburst storm with 80-mph winds struck the camp.
The 87-member squadron scrambled to secure the Predators and other exposed aircraft. They managed to save more than half of the “high-value, Remotely Piloted Aircraft assets from destruction, and most importantly, prevented injury and any loss of life,” according toa brief account published in Combat Edge, an Air Force safety magazine.
Even normal weather conditions could be brutal, with summertime temperatures reaching 120 degrees on top of 80 percent humidity.
“Our war reserve air conditioners literally short-circuited in the vain attempt to cool the tents in which we worked,” recalled Lt. Col. Thomas McCurley, the squadron commander. “Our small group of security forces personnel guarded the compound, flight line and other allied assets at posts exposed to the elements with no air conditioning at all.”
McCurley’s rare public account of the squadron’s activities came in June, when the Air Force awarded him a Bronze Star. At the ceremony, he avoided any explicit mention of the Predators or Camp Lemonnier. But his narrative matched what is known about the squadron’s deployment to Djibouti.
“Our greatest accomplishment was that we flew every single sortie the Air Force asked us to fly, despite the challenges we encountered,” he said. “We were an integral part in taking down some very important targets, which means a lot to me.”
He did not mention it, but the unit had gotten into the spirit of its mission by designing a uniform patch emblazoned with a skull, crossbones and a suitable nickname: “East Africa Air Pirates.”
The Air Force denied a request from The Post to interview McCurley.
Increased traffic
The frequency of U.S. military flights from Djibouti has soared, overwhelming air-traffic controllers and making the skies more dangerous.
The number of takeoffs and landings each month has more than doubled, reaching a peak of 1,666 in July compared with a monthly average of 768 two years ago, according to air-traffic statistics disclosed in Defense Department contracting documents.
Drones now account for about 30 percent of daily U.S. military flight operations at Lemonnier, according to a Post analysis.
The increased activity has meant more mishaps. Last year, drones were involved in “a string of near mid-air collisions” with NATO planes off the Horn of Africa, according to a brief safety alert published in Combat Edge magazine.
Drones also pose an aviation risk next door in Somalia. Over the past year, remote-controlled aircraft have plunged into a refugee camp, flown perilously close to a fuel dump and almost collided with a large passenger plane over Mogadishu, the capital, according to a United Nations report.
Manned planes are crashing, too. An Air Force U-28A surveillance plane crashed five miles from Camp Lemonnier while returning from a secret mission on Feb. 18, killing the four-person crew. An Air Force investigation attributed the accident to “unrecognized spatial disorientation” on the part of the crew, which ignored sensor warnings that it was flying too close to the ground.
Baker, the two-star commander at Lemonnier, played down the crashes and near-misses. He said safety had improved since he arrived in Djibouti in May.
“We’ve dramatically reduced any incidents of concern, certainly since I’ve been here,” he said.
Last month, the Defense Department awarded a $7 million contract to retrain beleaguered air-traffic controllers at Ambouli International Airport and improve their English skills.
The Djiboutian controllers handle all civilian and U.S. military aircraft. But they are “undermanned” and “over tasked due to the recent rapid increase in U.S. military flights,” according to the contract. It also states that the controllers and the airport are not in compliance with international aviation standards.
Resolving those deficiencies may not be sufficient. Records show the U.S. military is also scrambling for an alternative place for its planes to land in an emergency.
Last month, it awarded a contract to install portable lighting at the only backup site available: a tiny, makeshift airstrip in the Djiboutian desert, several miles from Lemonnier.